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Abstract 
To Train or Not To Train:  





Planners often face the especially difficult and important task of assigning programs or treatments to 
optimize outcomes.  Using the recent welfare-to-work reforms as an illustration, this paper considers the 
normative problem of how administrators might use data from randomized experiments to assign 
treatments. Under the new welfare system, state governments must design welfare programs to optimize 
employment.  With experimental results in-hand, planners observe the average effect of training on 
employment but may not observe the individual effect of training.  If the effect of a treatment varies 
across individuals, the planner faces a decision problem under ambiguity (Manski, 1998). In this setting, I 
find a straightforward proposition formalizes conditions under which a planner should reject particular 
decision rules as being inferior. An optimal decision rule, however, may not be revealed. In the absence of 
strong assumptions about the degree of heterogeneity in the population or the information known by the 
planner, the data are inconclusive about the efficacy of most assignment rules.   1 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
  Decision-makers often face the especially difficult and important task of assigning programs to 
heterogeneous populations. In the United States welfare system, for example, state planners must design 
and implement programs that both provide assistance and, at the same time, meet various employment 
standards. In this setting, a single program is unlikely to improve the employment prospects for everyone in 
a caseload which includes individuals with a broad range of skills, backgrounds and challenges (Eberts, 
1997; Pavetti, L. et al., 1999; Pepper, 2001).   Instead, planners must use the available information to 
optimally assign programs to individual recipients.
1 
  In this paper I evaluate the caseworkers’ decision problem in different informational settings.  
Using the basic framework found in Manski (1998, 2000) and Manski, Newman and Pepper 
(forthcoming), I assume the planner wants to choose a treatment assignment rule to maximize an expected 
outcome, say the population employment probability. That is, the planner wants to maximize a utilitarian 
social welfare function.
2  The planner is assumed to observe summary results from an idealized social 
experiment and may also know certain characteristics of the recipient.  Four well-known experiments 
conducted by the Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation (MDRC) in the 1980s are used to 
illustrate the methods.  
  This general informational setting in which the planner combines experiments with covariate 
information to make optimal treatment choices is commonplace under the new welfare regime. 
                                                 
1 Given the recent reforms, the problems faced by welfare caseworkers are particularly germane. However, these 
decision problems are not unique.  For example, police and judges decide how to treat (potential) offenders, 
educators assign students to classes and institutions, doctors and counselors prescribe treatments, editors accept or 
reject manuscripts, and so on. In each of these cases and many more, the planner may combine empirical evidence on 
the effectiveness of different treatment regimes with additional information about the individual recipient. 
 
2 Of course, one might consider evaluating other features of the distribution of outcomes. See, for example, Heckman, 
Smith and Clements (1997).   2 
 
 
Caseworkers often observe detailed background characteristics of the recipients and experimental 
analyses are thought to provide relevant data.  In fact, employment and job-readiness programs like those 
evaluated by the MDRC were used, in part, to motivate the federal reform, have been used to inform 
planners in the new regime, and are a key component of every state program.
3 
  In Section 2, I describe the MDRC demonstrations and characterize data from ideal randomized 
experiments that abstract from concerns over the validity of the demonstration. Section 3 then outlines the 
basic methodology that considers the normative problem of optimal treatment choice given heterogeneous 
populations. Caseworkers are responsible for matching individual recipients with the “appropriate” welfare 
program.   The feasible assignment rules and the planner’s ability to evaluate them depend on the available 
information about treatments and outcomes.  If the caseworker has prior information regarding how 
different treatments affect each recipient, she can maximize each person’s outcome.  In particular, she 
would assign training to everyone who “benefits” from training (that is, persons who would work if given 
training but not otherwise), and cash assistance to everyone else.  In general, however, planners are not 
likely to have this level of detailed information.   
A more pragmatic setting arises under the assumption that the planner has less extensive 
information on the effectiveness of different treatments.  Rather than knowing the individual response 
function, the planner may only observe the employment probabilities revealed by the experiment. In this 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
3 Michalopoulos and Schwartz (2000), evaluate 20 work-first demonstration programs, including the MDRC’s SWIM 
program, in a report prepared for the United States Department of Health and Human Services on the potential 
effectiveness of different welfare to work programs in the new regime. The Riverside program in California has been 
used to motivate work first reform at the state and national levels (Hotz, Imbens, Klerman, 2000). While most 
demonstration programs, including the MDRC programs evaluated in this paper, show modest employment effects, 
the Riverside program increased the employment rate from 35.3% for the control group to 49% of the treatment group.  
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partial information case, the best solution is to choose a single treatment that maximizes the employment 
probability for each observed subgroup.  If the employment probability under training exceeds the 
employment probability under cash assistance, she would assign training.   
  Section 4 examines the asymmetric informational setting where a planner observes covariates that 
are not revealed in the experiment.  In practice, caseworkers observe detailed information on recipients 
including demographics, work and welfare histories, schooling, neighborhood characteristics, family 
background, and other socio-economic indicators.  The experimental outcomes for these observed sub-
populations, however, might be unknown for several reasons.  First, welfare-to-work experiments often do 
not record detailed background information on the recipients. Second, the published results from the 
experiments from which caseworkers are likely to base their inferences often do not report detailed 
covariate information. Gueron and Pauly’s (1991) important evaluation of the MDRC experiments, for 
example, reports employment probabilities for the treatment and control groups, but does not present 
results for subgroups. Finally, caseworkers may be prohibited from explicitly using certain information 
including the age, race and gender of the recipient when assigning treatments.  
  In this informational setting, the experiment does not reveal the mean outcome for the subgroups 
identified by the planner. Thus, the caseworker may not be able to maximize the employment probability 
given the observed information.  Rather, the planner must make a decision given ambiguous information 
about the optimal assignment rule. 
  The conclusions that can be drawn depend critically on the available data and prior information the 
planner can bring to bear. If data on the outcome of interest are combined with sufficiently strong 
assumptions, the outcome probability under different assignment rules may be identified, implying a well-
defined assignment process. In practice, the most common assumption is that all persons benefit from   4 
 
 
training (i.e., homogenous effects), in which case all persons should receive a single treatment. Parametric 
latent variable models describing how treatments are selected and outcomes determined may also identify 
the outcome probability under alternative treatment rules (see, for example, Dehejia, forthcoming). 
  A social planner, concerned about the credibility of her findings to policymakers and the public, 
might be inclined to impose more conservative assumptions. Indeed, as in Pepper (2001), I evaluate what 
can be learned about various assignment rules given weak assumptions on the process determining 
outcomes and prior information. In this conservative setting, I find a straightforward proposition formalizes 
conditions under which a planner should reject particular decision rules as being inferior. For instance, 
assigning everyone to receive cash-assistance might be strictly dominated by assigning everyone to 
receive training.  An optimal decision rule, however, cannot be identified. In the absence of strong 
assumptions about the degree of heterogeneity in the population or the information known by the planner, 
the data are inconclusive about the efficacy of most assignment rules. 
  Section 5 concludes by considering practical solutions to the decision making process under 
ambiguity.  What might the planner do when the experiment does not reveal the optimal decision rule?  
 
2.  What Welfare-to-Work Experiments Reveal to the Caseworker 
  This section describes the welfare-to-work experiments. I consider experiments that evaluate two 
alternative treatments:  the standard benefit program and assignment to a welfare-to-work training 
program.  I assume an ideal experimental design where the subjects are randomly selected and assigned to 
one of the two mutually exclusive treatments, the subjects do not interact with each other, and the program 
administrators are not influenced by the experiment.  Subjects may or may not comply with their assigned 
treatment so that the experiment identifies the effect of the intention-to-treat.  Finally, I also assume that   5 
 
 
the samples are large enough that the planner may abstract from sampling variability when interpreting the 
empirical evidence.   
    Section 2.1 considers what information these experiments reveal about employment outcomes 
under mandatory training.  Section 2.2 describes the four experiments conducted by the Manpower 
Demonstration Research Corporation (MDRC) during the mid-1980s. As suggested above, it seems likely 
that program administrators and caseworkers may use experiments conducted over the past 30 years to 
evaluate and consider optimal assignment rules. After all, these experiments provide the only source of 
information for many of the innovative programs state and local governments might consider adopting.   
 
2.1  What Do Welfare-to-Work Experiments Reveal? 
  What do the data reveal?  To evaluate this basic questions, it is useful to distinguish between the 
outcome that would occur were a welfare recipient to have been assigned to training y(1), and the 
outcome that would occur were she to have received the standard benefits, y(0).  In particular, let y(·) 
equal one if the individual would have participated in the labor force after the treatment period and zero 
otherwise.  Let z denote the actual treatment received, where z = 1 if assigned to training and 0 otherwise.   
  For those who were assigned to training (z = 1) the employment indicator y(1) is observed but y(0) 
is latent, while for those who received the standard benefits (z = 0) the outcome y(0) is observed but y(1) 
is latent.  Thus, the data reveal the employment probability for those who were assigned to training, P[ 
y(1) = 1 | z = 1], and for those who received standard benefits, P[ y(0) = 1 | z = 0].   
  In social experiments, the actual treatment received is randomly assigned so that the treatment, z, 
is statistically independent of the labor force participation indicators, y(1) and y(0).   That is, the labor 
force participation probability of those who were assigned to training, P[ y(1) = 1 | z = 1], reveals the   6 
 
 
outcome that would occur if everyone where to receive training, P[ y(1) = 1].   Likewise, the employment 
probability of those assigned to the control group, P[ y(0) = 1 | z = 0], reveals the outcome that would 
occur if the entire caseload received the standard benefits package, P[ y(0) = 1].     
  In practice, whether particular experiments actually reveal the distribution of outcomes under 
mandatory treatment policies may be of considerable disagreement.  There are many well-known and 
important critiques.
4  A program may not be properly implemented, so that the outcomes, y(1) and y(0), 
depend upon the realized treatment z.   Even if properly run, a more fundamental question is whether the 
demonstration program operates in the same fashion as it would if it were actually implemented.  
Certainly, concerns about external validity are germane (Campbell and Stanley, 1966; Hotz, Imbens, and 
Mortimer, 1999): Macro-feedback effects (Garfinkel, Manski and Michalopolous, 1992), Hawthorne 
Effects, and entry effects (Heckman, 1992; Moffitt, 1992) all suggest that small scale demonstration 
projects may not reveal the outcomes that would occur if the program were instituted on a larger scale.  
Furthermore, the economy and the welfare system have undergone major changes over the last decade 
that may not be reflected in many of the relevant experiments.
 5 
  In this paper, I abstract from these concerns by assuming that the demonstrations observed by the 
planners identify the effects of being assigned to a job-training program.  That is, the data are assumed to 
reveal the labor force participation probability if all recipients are assigned to training, P[ y(1) = 1 ], or if all 
                                                 
4 See Campbell, D. and J. Stanley. (1966), Hausman and Wise (1985) and Manski and Garfinkel (1992) for general 
critiques of the experimental methodology.  Wiseman (1991) and Greenberg and Wiseman (1992) critically examine the 
MDRC demonstrations. 
 
5 Hotz et al. (1999) consider how variability in the population and in the programs components may compromise the 
external validity of the MDRC experiments. In this analysis I implicitly assume the programs components and the 
population distribution do not vary under the new regime.  
   7 
 
 
recipients are given the standard benefits, P[ y(0) = 1].  Maintaining this best-case assumption, I focus on 
the resulting decision problems that have received almost no attention in the literature.  
 
2.2     MDRC Experiments 
  During the mid-1980s, the Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation (MDRC) evaluated 
four welfare-to-work training programs:  the Arkansas WORK Program, the Baltimore Options Program, 
the San Diego Saturation Work Initiative Model (SWIM), and the Virginia Employment Services Program 
(ESP).   The MDRC randomly selected samples of size 1127, 2757, 3211, and 3150, in Arkansas, 
Baltimore, San Diego and Virginia, respectively.   For each program, welfare recipients were randomly 
assigned to either participate in a basic work or training activity, or to receive the standard benefits 
package.   For each subject, the data reveal the treatment received – training or the standard welfare 
benefits - and numerous labor market and welfare participation outcome measures.  In this paper, the 
outcome variable of interest is whether or not the respondent participated in the labor force two years 
after treatment.   
  These MDRC experiments appear particularly relevant for evaluating the types of welfare and 
training programs which might be adopted under new regime.  These evaluations are generally regarded 
as well designed and implemented social experiments (see, for example, Greenberg and Wiseman (1992), 
and Wiseman (1991)).   Furthermore, each evaluation was broad based and mandatory.  All single parent 
families receiving AFDC and whose children were at least 6 years of age were required to participate.
6  
                                                 
6 Noncompliance with the assigned treatment led to sanctions or possible expulsion from the program.  Over 50 
percent of the caseload complied with the assigned training.  Those that did not comply either exited the welfare 
system, were sanctioned, or were excused for reasonable cause. 
 
 
   8 
 
 
Finally, the programs generally stressed labor force participation rather than human capital development. 
The modest training programs focused on supervised job search and unpaid work assignments. 
Educational activities were only offered in limited cases. For additional details on these experiments see 
Gueron and Pauly (1991) and Friedlander and Burtless (1995).   
  Table 1 displays the estimated employment probability for the treatment and control groups.  In 
each case, the estimates confirm the well-established results that job-training programs slightly increase 
the probability of employment.  Under the Virginia Employment Service Program (ESP), for instance, the 
labor force participation probability if all welfare recipients receive training is estimated to be 39.0 percent.  
If instead, all welfare recipients receive the standard benefits, these data suggest that 33.9 percent would 
be working after two years.  Thus, the ESP increases the probability of employment by 0.051. 
 
3.   The Caseworker’s Problem   
  The caseworker’s problem is to optimally assign treatments using the employment probabilities 
revealed by a welfare-to-work demonstration.  To evaluate this problem it is useful to divide the population 
into those that are and are not affected by treatment.  The treatment assignment process only affects 
some individuals.  In particular, a fraction P[ y(1) = 1 1 y(0) = 0 ]  of the caseload “benefits” from job 
training, while a fraction P[ y(1) = 0 1 y(0) = 1 ]  “benefits” from the standard program.  The remainder 
are unaffected by the treatment policy, with some fraction P[ y(1) = 1 1 y(0) = 1 ] participating in the 
labor force regardless of the treatment and some fraction P[y(1) = 0 1 y(0) = 0 ] unemployed regardless.  
  Suppose that the planner wants to choose a treatment rule, zm, to maximize the employment 
probability, P[ y (zm) = 1 ].  Ideally, the planner would assign training to those that benefit from training, 
and cash assistance to everyone else.  A fundamental identification problem occurs in that data cannot 
reveal the counterfactual outcomes of interest (see Manski, 1997; Pepper, 2001).  One cannot, for   9 
 
 
example, observe the labor market outcomes of an individual assigned to receive training if she were to 
have instead received the standard benefits.  Likewise, we cannot observe how a recipient who was given 
cash-assistance would have behaved had she instead received job training.  Thus, the outcome will depend 
critically on the planner’s knowledge of treatment response.   
  In this section, I consider two extreme information settings. Section 3.1 considers the optimal 
assignment rule in the case where the planner fully observes the response functions, {y(1), y(0)}, for each 
individual.  Section 3.2 considers the optimal assignment rule when the planner knows nothing more than is 
revealed by the experiments, namely the employment probability under mandatory training, P[ y(1) = 1], 
and mandatory standard benefits, P[ y(0) = 1].  
 
3.1   Treatment Assignment with Full Information  
    Consider the best case scenario where caseworkers know the employment indicators{ yi(1), 
yi(0) } for each individual and select the treatment, job training or standard benefits, to maximize the labor 
force participation probability.  That is, for each individual i, the caseworker assigns training so that 
 
(1.)    yi(zm) = max [yi(1), yi(0)].          
                   
In this full information scenario, the treatment selection policy will maximize the labor force participation 
probability.   
  Since some fraction of the caseload will remain unemployed regardless of the assignment process, 
the realized employment probability is  
 




To implement this optimal assignment rule, the planner uses prior information regarding the response 
functions of each recipient. The planner does not use the experiment to inform her decisions.    
  Still, the experiments might reveal ex-ante information about the optimal employment rate revealed 
in (2). Although the experiment cannot reveal what fraction of the caseload remains unemployed 
regardless, information on the employment probabilities under uniform treatments can be use to bound this 
joint probability (Manski, 1997, Pepper, 2001).  Intuitively, under this assignment rule administrators can do 
no worse in terms of maximizing the employment probability of welfare recipients than what would have 
occurred if all recipients were assigned to job training, and no better than the sum of the two employment 
probabilities (see Frechet, 1951 and Manski, 1997).  That is, 
 
(3.)  Max{P[ y(1) =1 ], P[ y(0) = 1 ] } # P[ y(zm) = 1  ] # Min{1, P[ y(1) =1 ] + P[ y(0) = 1 ] }  
   
 
(Manski, 1997, Proposition 6). 
  Even in this best-case model, where planners with rational expectations maximize the expected 
outcome, there remains much uncertainty. Consider, for instance, Virginia’s ESP program.  If planners 
combine this program with an outcome optimization assignment rule, the estimated bounds imply that at 
least 39.0 percent and at most 72.9 percent of welfare recipients will be employed after two years.   
 
3.2  Treatment Assignment with Partial Information 
  In practice, caseworkers are unlikely to be able to distinguish among the outcomes yi(1) and yi(0) 
for each individual, i.  A planner who does not have advanced knowledge of the outcomes of the response   11 
 
 
functions for particular individuals may not implement the optimal assignment rule in Equation (1). Instead, 
treatment decisions must be made with some degree of uncertainty.   
  Assume the caseworker observes covariates X for each member of the population and knows the 
employment probability for each sub-population, P[ y(") = 1 | x ].  The planner cannot, however, 
distinguish among persons with the same covariates and so cannot implement treatment rules that 
effectively differentiate among these persons.  In this second best world, the planner is only concerned 
with the distribution of outcomes across the observed sub-populations, not with the experiences of 
particular persons.  Treatment choice must be based on the employment probability, P[ y(") = 1 | x ], 
alone.  Formally, a caseworker that observes certain covariates X assigns training so that 
 
(4.)    P[ y(zm) = 1 | x ] = max{P[y(1) = 1 | x], P[ y(0) = 1 | x ] }.
7     
 
Each member of a sub-population defined by X receives the same treatment.  
  If, for example, the caseworker does not observe any covariates, the optimal assignment rule 
either gives all persons training or all standard benefits:  P[ y(zm) = 1 ] = max{P[y(1) = 1 ], P[ y(0) = 1]}.   
In this setting, the results in Table 1 suggest that all recipients should be assigned to training, in which case 
about one-third of the caseload will work under the Baltimore, San Diego and Virginia programs. 
  Although the optimal assignment rule in the partial information setting maximizes the employment 
probability conditional on the observed covariates, the assignment rule in Equation (4) is weakly dominated 
by the full information assignment rule described in Equation (1).   To see this, note that the employment 
                                                 
7This decision rule is implicit in statistical profiling models used to target services. See, for example, Berger, Black, 
and Smith (2000), and Eberts (1997). 
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probability under this partial information setting equals the lower bound (Equation 3) under full information.  
The two assignment rules are equal if being assigned to a particular treatment, say training, never reduces 
the likelihood of participating in the labor force.  That is, P[ y(1) = 0 ˙ y(0) = 1 | x ] = 0.  After all, the 
planner can do no better in terms of maximizing the employment probability than assigning everyone to 
training and no worse than assigning everyone standard benefits.  If instead, the effects of training are 
heterogeneous, with some fraction unaffected, some fraction employed only if assigned to training, and 
some fraction employed only if given standard benefits, the second best allocation rule is not optimal. 
Without full information, some persons will benefit from the assignment rule in Equation (4) and others will 
be hurt. 
 
4.  Treatment Choice with Asymmetric Information 
  Thus far, I have considered two extreme informational settings.  Either the planner knows the 
effect of treatment for each recipient, in which case she can optimize outcomes for each individual, or the 
planner has no prior information about treatment response, in which case she must base treatment choice 
on the available empirical evidence alone.  In this section, I explore the implications of a middle ground 
situation which is likely to apply in practice. In particular, the planner knows the effect of training on the 
employment probability from a welfare-to-work experiment. She also observe characteristics, X, of each 
member of the population and knows the population distribution, P(x), of these observed covariates.   
These characteristics, however, are not revealed for the experimental subjects or at least by the published 
summary results.  
  Observing covariates enables the planner to choose a treatment rule that differentiates among 
members of the population.  However, without prior knowledge of the employment probabilities conditional   13 
 
 
on these covariates, the planner cannot systematically use this information to choose a better treatment 
rule and may unintentionally choose a worse treatment rule.
8  
  What treatment rule should the planner choose to optimize employment when the response 
functions are not observed? Section 4.1 evaluates this question in the general setting where the planner 
can uniquely identify each individual and thus can consider any heterogeneous assignment rule.   Section 
4.2, as in Manski (1998), illustrates the general method by considering the special case where the planner 
only observes a binary covariate, say whether or not the recipient has relevant labor market experience.  
In both settings, the planner faces a decision problem under ambiguity (see Manksi, 1998, 2000). In 
ambiguous settings, there is generally no optimal way to decide among the alternatives. Rather, the best 
the planner can do is rule out certain options.   
 
4.1      Treatment Assignment Rules With Complete Covariate Information 
  Suppose the caseworker uniquely observes each member, i, of the caseload but does not know the 
individual response function, yi(·).  Rather, from the experiment, the planner knows P[y(1) ] and P[ y(0) 
].  The planner’s objective is to maximize employment among the caseload given the experiment and 
information identifying each recipient.   In this setting, the caseworker must decide among any permutation 
                                                 
8 There are many situations where the response probability, P[ y(") ] may not be observed.  At the most basic level, 
we draw inferences on the employment probability using a sample of observations, not the population.  That is, 
rather than observing the true response function we only observe consistent estimate of the employment 
probabilities (see Manski, 2000). Even if we abstract from concerns of statistical variability, a large literature on 
identification problems suggest that both observational and experimental data alone may not fully reveal the 
response functions of interest. In observational studies, one must address the selection problem that the decision to 
participate in a training program is not random and thus the observed data alone cannot reveal P[ y(") = 1]. 
Experiments in which the selection process is designed to be random may still not reveal the response function if 
there remain concerns about internal and external validity. In this paper, I abstract from concerns about statistical 
variability as well as concerns over the validity of the experiments (see Section 2) and focus instead on the ambiguity 
created by asymmetric information between the planner and the experiment.   
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of assignment rules from the extreme mandatory training or mandatory cash assistance rules evaluated in 
the second best informational setting above, to heterogeneous assignment rules like those adopted in the 
full information setting.  
To illustrate how the identification problem faced by the planner complicates the assignment 
process, suppose a caseworker is faced with assigning the ESP program evaluated in Virginia. The 
estimates displayed in Table 1 imply that the labor force participation probability would be 39.0 percent 
under mandatory training and 33.9 percent under standard benefits.  Many joint distributions are consistent 
with these marginal probabilities.  Consider the two extreme cases.  Table 2A displays the joint distribution 
with the strongest positive correlation between the two outcomes so that the treatment has the smallest 
possible influence on employment.  Only 5.1 percent of respondents benefit from training, and no one 
benefits from the standard program.  Given this distribution, at most 39.0 percent of the caseload will 
participate in the labor force while at least 33.9 percent will participate. Table 2B displays the other 
extreme where the outcomes exhibit the strongest negative correlation so that the treatment has the 
largest possible effect on outcomes.  Regardless of the selection method, at least 27.1 percent of the 
caseload will be unemployed.   The labor force participation outcomes of the remaining 72.9 percent of the 
caseload depend upon the assignment process.  
Using these extreme distributions, one can evaluate what is known about different assignment 
policies. Suppose, for example, that the planner considers four different possible rules: training everyone, 
training half the caseload, training one-quarter of the caseload, and not training anyone. Under the two 
uniform assignment rules the experiment reveals the employment probability.  If all persons were trained, 
39.0 percent of the caseload would work. If all persons were given standard benefits, 33.9 percent would 
work.     15 
 
 
If assignment is heterogeneous, the results are less certain.   Suppose the planner assigns half the 
caseload to be trained. In the best case, all of the recipients assigned to training would benefit from 
training so that the labor force participation probability would be 72.9 percent (P[ y(1) = 1] + P[ y(0) = 1]), 
or the upper bound in the full information setting. In the worst case, the planner assigns training to the 33.9 
percent who benefit from cash assistance, and the entire caseload might be unemployed. Thus, under this 
assignment rule, between [0, 72.9] percent of the caseload will be employed.  Likewise, under an 
assignment rule where 25 percent are assigned to training, the employment probability will lie between 
[8.9, 58.9].  
Clearly, mandatory training is preferred to mandatory standard benefits. For that matter, rules that 
train less 5.1 percent of the caseload are dominated by a mandatory training rule.  Other heterogeneous 
rules are undominated.  The planner cannot know whether the optimal policy is to train everyone, to train 
half the caseload, or to train substantially fewer. The answer to this question depends on two unknown 
factors: the fraction of the caseload affected by treatment and efficacy of the assignment policy. If there 
is substantial heterogeneity in treatment response (Table 2b), the planner can do much better or much 
worse than a mandatory training policy.  
  To formalize this planner’s problem, it is useful to split the decision into two parts: first determine 
the optimal fraction to train and then decide which respondents to train.  Since the planner has no prior 
information that effectively leads her to pick those who are trained and those who are given standard 
benefits, the first stage decision problem completely summarizes the choice problem.  
  Assume the planner decides on the fraction of welfare recipients who receive job training in order 
to maximize employment.  Let p = P[zm = 1 ] be the fraction of recipients who will receive training, and 1-  16 
 
 
p = P[zm  = 0 ] be the fraction who will receive standard benefits.  Then, using the law of total probability, 
we know that 
 
(5.)     P[ y(zm) = 1  ]  = P[ y(1) = 1 | zm = 1]@p  +  P[ y(0) = 1 |  zm = 0]@(1-p). 
 
The planner does not know the employment probabilities for those who will be trained, P[ y(1) = 1 | zm = 
1], nor for those who will receive standard benefits,  P[ y(0) = 1 |  zm = 0].  After all, the planner does not 
know the response functions for each individual, i.  
  Information on the observed outcomes under uniform treatment policies, however, can be used to 
bound the labor force participation probability.  The experiment reveals the probability a recipient works if 
everyone is assigned to training P[y(1) = 1 ] while our interest is in learning the labor force participation 
probability for those who will be assigned to training.  The relationship between these two probabilities is 
highlighted using the law of total probability to write 
 
(6.)    P[y(1) = 1 ]   =   P[y(1) = 1* zm = 1] @p +P[y(1) = 1* zm = 0] @ (1-p).   
 
Since the unknown probability P[y(1) = 1* zm = 0] lies in the interval [0, 1] we can bound the labor force 
participation probability for recipients who will be assigned to training.  In particular, 
 
(7.)     Max[ 0, (P[y(1) = 1 | x]-1+ p)/p ]  # P[y(1) = 1*x, zm = 1]  # Min[ 1, P[y(1) = 1 | x] / p ]. 
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Analogous bounds can be derived for the labor force participation probability for those who will receive 
standard benefits, P[y(0) = 1* zm = 0]. 
  From Equations (5) and  (7) it follows that  
    max{ 0, P[ y(1) = 1 ] - (1-p) } + max{ 0, P[ y(0) = 1 ] - p} 
(8.)        #  P[ ym = 1 ]   #         
 
min{ p, P[ y(1) = 1 ] } + min{ 1- p, P[ y(0) = 1 ] } 
 
 
Manski (1997, Proposition 7).  Notice that as the fraction trained approaches one, the bounds center 
around the outcome that would be observed if all recipients are assigned to training, P[ y(1) = 1  ], while as 
the fraction approaches zero the bounds center around the outcome that would be observed if all recipients 
receive standard benefits, P[ y(0) = 1 ].   
The planner’s problem is to determine the fraction, p, which optimizes the employment probability 
under an arbitrary assignment rule m.  Assume, without loss of generality, the employment rate under 
mandatory training exceeds the employment rate under standard benefits. In this case, the lower bound in 
(8) is maximized when all persons receive training, p = 1.  
By maximizing the lower bound, this maximin rule serves as a benchmark for all alternative 
assignment rules, p < 1. In this informational setting, no other assignment rule can strictly dominate 
mandatory training.  However, rules that lead to bounds that include the maximin outcome are 
undominated; the planner cannot determine whether the outcome under mandatory training will be better 
or worse than the outcome under the alternative heterogeneous assignment rule. Rules where the upper 
bound in (8) is less than the mandatory training outcome are dominated. That is, an assignment rule is 
dominated by mandatory training iff p + P[ y(0) = 1] < P[ y(1) = 1].  Thus, we have  




   For Bernoulli random variables y(1) and y(0), let P[ y(1) = 1] and P[ y(0) = 1 ] be 
known. Assume, without loss of generality, that P[ y(1) = 1 ] $P[ y(0) = 1 ].  Let P[ zm = 1] = p. 
Then rules where p < P[ y(1) = 1] – P[ y(0) =1]  are dominated. All other rules are undominated. 
 
Proposition 1 reveals that in this asymmetrical informational setting the planner cannot determine 
an optimal treatment policy. Rather, the best she can do is rule out policies that train less than the revealed 
effect of training, that is, P[ y(1) = 1] – P[ y(0) = 1].   So, for example, Table 1 reveals that a planner 
using the Baltimore program should at least train 1.1 percent of the caseload, whereas a planner using the 
San Diego program should at least train 6.5 percent of the caseload.   Any assignment rule that fails to 
satisfy these conditions cannot be optimal.  Any assignment rule satisfying these conditions may or may 
not be optimal.  
In this informational setting, the caseworker has the power to assign individualistic treatments but 
does not have the information to optimally implement a heterogeneous treatment policy.   Remarkably, in 
contrast to the partial information setting examined above, additional covariates in asymmetric settings may 
degrade the quality of decision-making.  While the planner can choose a treatment rule that differentiates 
among the members of the population, the absence of information on the outcomes may lead to sub-
optimal decisions rules (Manski, 1998).  By chance, the planner might replicate the optimal assignment 
policy in full information, namely assigning treatment such that the only persons not working are those that 
will be unemployed regardless. In this best case scenario, the employment probability would equal 1 – P[ 
y(1) = 1 ˙ y(0) = 0].  By chance, the planner might instead assign all those who benefit from training to 
receive cash assistance so that the only persons working are those that would be employed regardless.  In   19
this worst case scenario, the employment probability would equal P[ y(1) = 1 ˙ y(0) = 1].  Formally, the 
bounds in Equation 8 imply that the employment probability may lie between  
 
(9.)   max{0, P[ y(1) = 1 ] + P[ y(0) = 1] - 1 }# P[ ym = 1 | x] # min{ P[ y(1) = 1 ]+ P[ y(0) = 1 ], 1 }.  
 
  Table 3 presents these bounds for each of the four MDRC programs.  Clearly, the class of 
undominated assignment policies may have an extremely wide range of consequences for the employment 
probability. The upper bound occurs if the caseworker happens to implement the optimal assignment policy 
under full information and the joint outcome distribution has the strongest negative correlation (see Table 
2B). The full unemployment case results if the planner inadvertently makes poor treatment choice 
decisions and the joint outcome distribution has the strongest negative correlation (see Table 2B). Thus, 
the realized employment probability depends on two unknown factors: the heterogeneity in treatment 
response and the efficacy of the assignment rule.  
 
4.2      Illustration:  Treatment Assignment with Partial Covariate Information 
  Rather than uniquely observing each individual and having complete freedom to assign treatments, 
a planner might only observe and/or focus on a subset of covariates.  Assume that the planner observes a 
binary covariate X, taking the values x = 0 and x = 1, and knows the distribution of the covariate, P[ X = 
1].  Say, for example, that X = 1 for respondents with recent labor market experience and X = 0 
otherwise.  The caseworker also observes the results from a welfare-to-work experiment that reveals the 
outcome under the mandated training regime, P[y(1) = 1], and the mandated cash assistance regime, P[ 
y(0) = 1].     20
  As in the partial information setting, the planner cannot distinguish among persons with the same 
observed covariates and does not implement treatment rules that systematically differentiate among 
observationally equivalent persons.  Thus, in this setting, there are only four different treatment rules to 
consider:  A. everyone receives training; B. no one receives training; C. respondents with experience 
receive training; D. respondents without experience receive training.
9   
  The bounds in Equation 8 determine which treatment rules are dominated. In particular, 
Proposition 1 reveals that a rule is inferior if the fraction trained is less than the treatment effect, p < P[ 
y(1) = 1] - P[ y(0) = 1].   
  Table 4A displays the estimated employment probability under the four assignment rules. The first 
column displays the fraction who work in the fourth-quarter prior to assignment, P( X=1 ), while the 
remaining columns display the possible outcomes under the four assignment rules.
10  There is much 
uncertainty about the optimal treatment assignment policy. In all cases, the fraction with and without 
experience exceeds the effect of training so that the only dominated rule is a policy of mandatory standard 
benefits.  The other three rules may or may not be optimal.  Depending on both the heterogeneity of 
response and efficacy of the assignment process, either of the two heterogeneous assignment policies 
might do substantially better than a mandatory training regime and either of them might do substantially 
worse.  Still, the uncertainty is less than in the prior setting where the planner observed all covariates (see 
Table 3). Restricting the choice set serves to not only lower the best possible outcome but also increase 
the worst possible outcome.   
                                                 
9 This is the same basic decision problem considered by Manski (1998).  
 
10 Although not typically reported (see Gueron and Pauly, 1991), the MDRC data actually include this employment 
indicator. 
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  Since the detailed MDRC data files actually include covariates on work experience one-year prior 
to assignment, I can use these data to determine the optimal treatment assignment policy under partial 
information (Section 3.2).  Table 4B displays the actual employment rate for each of the four assignments 
rules, and highlights the optimal rule.  For the Arkansas and Baltimore programs, training has a slight 
negative effect on the employment probability of persons with experience. Thus, a heterogeneous 
assignment rule training those without experience (D) leads to employment rates that slightly exceed those 
under a mandatory training regime. In contrast, mandatory training rules are optimal for the San Diego and 
Baltimore programs. 
  For purposes of illustration, Table 5 displays the estimated bounds under the assumption that 5 
percent of the caseload has an observed characteristic; P(X=1) = 0.05.  As revealed in Equation 8, the 
bounds center around P[ y(0) = 1] as the fraction receiving standard benefits approaches one.  Thus, in 
this setting, there is far less uncertainty about the optimal rules and outcomes. For the San Diego and 
Virginia programs, where the effect of training exceeds 0.05, a planner can rule out only training to those 
with experience (rule C).  Thus, the 95 percent of recipients without experience should all be trained. For 
the Arkansas and Baltimore programs, mandatory cash assistance remains the only dominated rule. Still, 
with the employment probability under either heterogeneous treatment policy lying within a 10 point range, 
there is much less uncertainty about the outcomes.  
 
5.  Conclusions:  What is a Caseworker to Do? 
  In this paper, I consider the normative question of how planners should assign treatments to 
optimize expected outcomes in different informational settings. With full information on the effect of 
treatment for each individual, the planner can maximize the employment probability.  With partial 
information, the planner would assign uniform treatments for each observed sub-group. Finally, in the likely   22
case where empirical evidence on the effectiveness of different treatments is combined with additional 
information about the individual recipient, the planner faces a decision problem under ambiguity.  In this 
setting, the data do not reveal the optimal decision rule.  Depending on the unknown fraction of the 
caseload affected by treatment and the efficacy of the treatment assignment rule, the additional 
information observed by the planner can improve or degrade the decision making process.  
  What then is a decision maker to do?  She might impose additional assumptions that are strong 
enough to reveal the optimal rule.  For instance, an assumption that training never reduces than chances of 
being employed implies that mandatory training is an optimal decision rule. Likewise, one might assume the 
planners always have rational expectations: planners learn the response functions given the observed 
information and can implement the optimal decision rule (under partial information).  The problem, of 
course, is that imposing assumptions that are not credible does not eliminate the ambiguity in the evaluation 
problem (Manski, 2000; Manski, Newman and Pepper, forthcoming). 
  If stronger assumptions are not imposed, the only way to resolve an indeterminate finding is to 
collect richer data.  In principal, for example, the problem could be resolved if the randomized experiments 
included and/or the summary reports displayed extensive covariate data for the subjects. 
  In the absence of stronger assumptions or richer data, the planner is confronted with making 
decisions in ambiguous settings.  An indeterminate finding, however, does not imply that the planner should 
be unwilling or unable to make decisions.  A planner, for instance, might formally appeal to alternative 
decision criteria (Manski, 2000).  One might adopt a Bayesian approach by placing a subjective distribution 
on the different possible outcome distributions and maximize expected welfare with respect to this 
distribution (see, for example, Dehejia, forthcoming).  A maximin rule that selects the treatment rule with 
the largest lower bound employment probability would lead to a mandatory training rule (Wald, 1950). 
Concerns over equity may lead other rules (Berger et al., 2000). A planner using a Bayesian, maximin or   23
some other criteria, will ultimately decide among the various undominated decision rules. The planner 
simply cannot assert that the chosen rule optimizes the employment probability.   
   24
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  Table 1: Estimated Probability of Employment Eight Quarters After Treatment  
 
  Control Group: 
P[ y(0) = 1 ] 
Treatment Group: 
P[ y(1) = 1 ] 

















Note: Bootstrapped 90 percent confidence intervals are in parentheses below the estimates.   27
Table 2A:   A Joint Distribution Consistent with the Labor Force Participation Probabilities for the Virginia 
Employment Services Program:  Strongest Positive Association Between the Outcomes 
   
     Treatment                             Training 
  Outcomes  y(1) = 0  y(1) = 1 
Standard Benefit  y(0) = 0  61.0%  5.1% 
  y(0) = 1  0.0%  33.9% 
         
 
Table 2B:   A Joint Distribution Consistent with the Labor Force Participation Probabilities for the  
Virginia Employment Services Program:  Strongest Negative Association Between the Outcomes 
 
   
    Treatment                             Training 
  Outcomes  y(1) = 0  y(1) = 1 
Standard Benefit  y(0) = 0  27.1%  39.0% 
  y(0) = 1  33.9%  0.0% 
           28
Table 3: Estimated No Assumption Bounds on the Probability of Employment Eight Quarters After 
Treatment Under Assignment Policy m, P[ ym = 1 ]  
 
  Lower Bound  Upper Bound 
Arkansas  0.0%  44.2% 
( 0.474) 
Baltimore  0.0%  76.5% 
(0.796) 
San Diego  0.0%  63.5% 
(0.661) 
Virginia  0.0%  72.9% 
(0. 759) 
Note: The 0.95 quantiles of bootstrapped upper bound are in parentheses below the estimates. 
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Table 4A:   No Assumption Bounds on the Probability of Employment Eight  
Quarters After Treatment Under Assignment Policies A-D.   
 
[X = 1 if respondent worked in 4
th quarter prior to assignment; 0 otherwise] 
    
State 
[ P(X=1) ] 
A.  
Z = 0 for all X 
B.  
Z = 1 for all X 
C.  
Z = 1 for X  = 1, Z 
=0 for X = 0 
D.  
Z = 1 for X = 0, Z 
=0 for X = 1 




[5.5, 35.5]  [8.8, 38.8] 




[8, 67.4]  [9.1, 68.5] 




[3.8,  53.2]  [10.3, 59.7] 




[13.9, 53.9]  [19.0, 59.0] 
 
 
Table 4B:   Probability of Employment Eight Quarters After Treatment Under  
Assignment Policies A-D  
 
[X = 1 if respondent worked in 4
th quarter prior to assignment; 0 otherwise] 
    
State 
[ P(X = 1) ]  
A.  
Z = 0 for all X 
B.  
Z = 1 for all X 
C.  
Z = 1 for X = 1, Z 
=0 for X = 0 
D.  
Z = 1 for X = 0, Z 





















29.8%  33.7% 




34.9%  37.8% 
Note: Highlighted cells indicate optimal employment probability under partial information.   30
 
  
Table 5:   Hypothetical No Assumption Bounds on the Probability of Employment Eight  







Z = 0 for all X 
B.  
Z = 1 for all X 
C.  
Z = 1 for X = 1, Z 
=0 for X = 0 
D.  
Z = 1 for X = 0, Z 
=0 for X = 1 




[15.5, 25.5]  [18.8, 28.8] 




[32,7, 42.7]  [33.8, 43.8] 




[23.5, 33.5]  [30.0, 40.0] 




[28.9, 38.9]  [34.0, 44.0] 
 
  
 